Definitions Essential for Unifying Terminology:\n\nTo avoid any misunderstandings regarding the goals and foundations for addressing the sectarian issue in Syria, the plan developed for the activities and conferences of the Workshop on Preserving National Unity and Criminalizing Sectarianism in Syria includes the following definitions:<\/p>\n
For further details, please refer to the article on the definition of sectarianism, sectarian leaders, and their impact.\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n Sectarianism is any action or statement aimed at diminishing the citizenship rights of any component of the national fabric in society based on religious or sectarian grounds, or creating an atmosphere of hatred, psychological incitement, and discrimination against them, or mobilizing them against other components of the national fabric.<\/p>\n Note: This is the definition we established at the beginning of the workshop to simplify the debate around terminology. However, in reality, sectarianism is broader than that. It is not limited solely to the diminishing of others' rights based on religious or sectarian grounds; it extends to the reduction of others' rights based on religious, sectarian, ethnic, or racial grounds.<\/p>\n Sectarian Leaders are those who incite sectarian strife. They are often politicians who lack religious, sectarian, or ethical commitment. Their sectarian stances are opportunistic strategies to gain political and economic benefits, with little regard for the fate of the common people from their sect who pay the price for these conflicts with their blood, culture, and future. The civil war that began in the 1970s remains the greatest lesson we can learn from, as we still see sectarian leaders and war criminals from that conflict reaping rewards, even under all governments, while the people continue to suffer hunger and deprivation.<\/p>\n Sectarianism emerges when sectarian leaders are allowed to operate and practice sectarian mobilization without fear of the law or accountability. This lack of legal deterrence enables the exploitation of sectarian divisions, fueling hatred and division within society, and allowing these leaders to manipulate public sentiment for personal or political gain.<\/p>\n The poorest individuals from all sects, particularly the Sunni community, are among the greatest victims of sectarianism. This is because they are often the most vulnerable and least able to protect themselves in sectarian conflicts. The Sunni community, in particular, tends to be the least involved in sectarianism due to the absence of centralized religious institutions or a clergy that could potentially lead sectarian mobilization. As a result, they often suffer the most during sectarian conflicts, bearing the brunt of violence, displacement, and social marginalization.<\/p>\n Sectarianism was a weapon used by the Syrian regime repeatedly to maintain power. Therefore, preserving national unity and criminalizing sectarianism are fundamental to disarming sectarianism from the hands of the ruling mafia in Syria, forcing them to either depart or be apprehended and brought to fair trials.<\/p>\n Hafez al-Assad could not have seized power and consolidated his control over the regime without using the weapon of sectarianism. Additionally, he gained global support when he was Minister of Defense and was involved in what is known as the \"Golan Heights Betrayal\" in 1967. As Minister of Defense, he ordered the Syrian army to lay down its weapons without a fight against the Zionist forces and to withdraw without firing a single shot at the Israeli enemy.<\/p>\n \"Qualitative withdrawal\" is a military term that refers to retreating without any strategy or plan, essentially meaning a mass escape. This led to most of the soldiers in the Syrian Arab Army walking back to their homes from the battlefield, leaving the fortified Golan Heights as an easy conquest for the Zionist forces.<\/p>\n Sectarian polarization in Syria was artificially created following Hafez al-Assad's coup, based on the principle of \"divide and conquer.\"<\/p>\n **The Assad Mafia regime derives its strength from being part of the Zionist project in the region. It has specialized in inciting sectarian strife (in addition to selling the Golan, theft, torture, destruction, and launching hollow slogans without any shred of shame). It fueled sectarian discord in Lebanon, with Israeli, American, and French support. This discord eventually turned into a civil war, which, in turn, affected the atmosphere in Syria and contributed to the sectarian tensions that led to the turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s in Syria, costing more than one hundred thousand martyrs, many of whom were innocent, and many others were doctors, engineers, and intellectuals. The ruling mafia also conspired to eliminate Palestinian resistance and expel it from Lebanon, in agreement with the Israeli enemy, after besieging the Palestinian Liberation Organization's forces in Tripoli and forcing them to leave Lebanon permanently, with the leadership relocating to Tunisia. Furthermore, it served as a key instrument in Iraq, igniting sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites, leading Prime Minister al-Maliki to threaten to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council to form an international tribunal to address terrorism and bombings in Iraq, which were planned in Syria.**<\/span><\/p>\n The Syrian Revolution succeeded in an unprecedented manner, enduring and growing in strength and spread. Therefore, retreat from the revolution is not an option and would mean death through torture.<\/p>\n All components of Syria have suffered, been oppressed, terrorized, kept in ignorance, robbed, and impoverished, with the first of them being the honorable Alawite sect. This has forced their children to work as intelligence agents, police officers, and soldiers to protect the Assad mafia.<\/p>\n With the outbreak of the revolution in Syria, the Assad mafia succeeded in inciting sectarian hysteria among some minority groups, especially the Alawites (according to the narrative propagated by Syrian media, which falsely claimed that the revolutionaries were chanting: \u201cThe Alawite to the coffin, and the Christian to Beirut\u201d). This led to their reluctance to join the revolution, delaying the fall of the regime. They were convinced that they would face death, trials, and persecution if the revolution succeeded. This fear drove many Alawites to oppose the revolution in self-defense, despite the fact that the Assad mafia had deeply humiliated and oppressed them, denying them genuine opportunities for education and cultural advancement.<\/p>\n What are the essential needs that should be addressed to activate minority involvement in the revolution and support the transition from dictatorship to a civil state? The answer can be summarized as follows:<\/p>\n 1- The concept of citizenship in the desired democratic national state is based on the principle of equality among all political, social, religious, and sectarian components, and granting minority groups their rights.<\/p>\n 2- The position of the Islamic opposition (commonly referred to as 'the bogeyman') regarding religious, sectarian, and ethnic minorities must be clearly stated, along with a clarification of the Muslim Brotherhood\u2019s stance on the events of the 1980s.<\/p>\n \"3- It is essential to define and provide concrete assurances to minority groups. This matter is of critical importance and sensitivity, as public opinion within minority communities is often shaped by intelligence officers acting on the recommendations of international consultants and experts in collective psychology. As a result, these minorities are led to live under a persistent illusion of existential threat and the specter of genocide. This issue is not recent, but rather the product of long-standing accumulations of fears and anxieties, particularly since the coup of Hafez al-Assad in Syria and the subsequent sectarian incidents and massacres throughout the 1970s and 1980s\u2014most notably the Hama massacre. During this period, a false notion was instilled in the consciousness of minority groups, namely that the Sunni majority would seek to annihilate the Alawite sect should the Assad regime fall, as a form of retaliation for the Hama massacre and other atrocities.<\/p>\n Accordingly, the assurances\u2014particularly those issued by Islamist groups, and most notably the Muslim Brotherhood\u2014must include the following:<\/p>\n \u2013 The regime in Syria does not represent a single religious sect, but rather consists of a group loyal to the regime\u2014individuals who have willingly subjected themselves to serving the ruling family that has monopolized power.<\/p>\n \u2013 It is the regime that has deliberately fueled sectarian sentiment within the country, relying on persuading segments of minority groups that its continued existence is their sole protection, and that its fall would result in their persecution or annihilation. Accordingly, our response to the regime must be devoid of any sectarian character.<\/p>\n \u2013 Emphasis must be placed on the fact that we are all Syrians, and that every sect in Syria constitutes an integral part of the overall fabric of the Syrian people. The history of Syria bears witness to the coexistence and harmony among all its sects, as evidenced by their unified stand against the French colonial occupation. This spirit of unity persisted after independence until the advent of the so-called 'Blessed Corrective Movement'.<\/p>\n \u2013 The Alawite sect was one of the most opposed to the Assad regime, and its members were among those who suffered the most in the prisons of Hafez al-Assad's regime (with the exception of the catastrophe of the 1980s, during which the regime succeeded in provoking certain Islamic groups into armed insurrection).<\/p>\n \u2013 The Islamists must adopt the following stance: We (the assembled representatives of the Islamic movement) are fully aware that, with the exception of a small number of security and military officers, the majority of Alawite community members are impoverished, and their condition is deplorable. It is inaccurate to claim that the poor Alawite is more privileged than the poor from other sects, as there is no privilege in poverty, humiliation, hunger, and need. On the contrary, they were, in many instances, the most vulnerable to humiliation and bullying by the deranged members of the Assad family and their thugs.<\/p>\n \u2013 If any sectarian practices, writings, or stances by certain extremists occurred before or during the uprising, whether on the media level or in real-life actions, we hereby declare our condemnation and rejection of such practices, and we declare a complete severance from any association with them.<\/p>\n \u2013 After the fall of the regime, we are all one people, and it is essential that tolerance and the path of reconciliation be our approach, along with the rejection of vengeance as our doctrine, our religion, and the commitment of the revolution towards others, including those who supported the regime, except for those whose hands are stained with blood, those who plundered public funds, and those whose situations should be determined by fair courts that guarantee their right to defend themselves and issue appropriate judgments regarding the crimes they have committed.<\/p>\n \u2013 We will all be equal in our love for the nation, and we will be united in building the country during that transitional phase after the fall of the regime, which will mark a historic turning point in the life of this nation.<\/p>\n Glory and eternal remembrance to the martyrs of the Syrian revolution.<\/p>\n Coordinator of the National Unity and Criminalization of Sectarianism Workshop. Dr. Socrat Al-Baaj<\/a><\/p>\n For review:<\/p>\n Workshop on the Criminalization of Sectarianism and Safeguarding National Unity in this regard. Link<\/a><\/p>\nDefinition of Sectarianism:<\/h2>\n
Definition of Sectarian Leaders:<\/span><\/h2>\n
When Does Sectarianism Emerge?<\/h2>\n
Victims of Sectarianism<\/h3>\n
Sectarianism in Syria<\/h2>\n
Facts and Background of the Sectarian Issue in Syria:<\/h2>\n
1- Assad's Mafia is part of the Zionist project.<\/h3>\n
2- The Syrian Revolution Succeeded<\/h3>\n
3- Components of the Syrian People<\/h3>\n
4- Inciting Sectarian Hysteria Among Minorities<\/h3>\n
Requirements for the Involvement of Minorities in the Revolution<\/h2>\n
Concept of Citizenship<\/h3>\n
The Position of the Islamic Opposition (the \"boogeyman\") on Minorities<\/h3>\n
Legal and political assurances for the protection of minority rights.<\/h3>\n